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COMMENTS
TOSSING ITS HAT IN THE RING: WITH
SUMMERLIN V. STEWART, THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EXPOSES THE HARMFUL AMBIGUITY CAUSED
BY RING V. ARIZONA
Gillian T. DiFilippo+
In the realm of criminal punishment, "'death is different."" Few issues
conjure up such intense debate as the death penalty. Its implications
stretch across social, political, moral, religious, and legal territory. While
public opinion surveys purport to demonstrate high levels of support for
the death penalty, critics argue for its abolishment based on the
irreversibility of capital punishment, its allegedly unfair implementation,
and its soaring costs. 2 Additionally, moral arguments against the death
penalty incite ardent debate from opponents, as the two sides attempt to
balance efficacy arguments and empirical evidence against the opinion
that capital punishment is simply immoral.'
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2005, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Louis J. Barracato for his advice and
guidance throughout the writing process, and her parents, Mary Ferol and Richard
DiFilippo, for their unwavering love, support, and sense of humor.
1. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring) (quoting Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 606 (2002), cert. granted sub nom.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003)).
2. HARRY HENDERSON, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 18-22 (rev. ed., 2000). Opponents
suggest that the mere possibility for error in executing a prisoner is the most practical
argument against capital punishment. Id. at 19. Other reasons include the more frequent
imposition of the death penalty on underprivileged members of society, and the enormous
monetary cost of capital sentencing, both of which indicate that eliminating the death
penalty would create a more efficient and fair criminal sentencing structure. Id. at 20-22.
Cf. Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the
Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1483 (2002) (acknowledging that public support
for capital punishment has dropped in recent years, "from a high of 80% in favor in 1994
to a low of 65% in favor in 2001, the lowest level of support in nineteen years").
3. RAPHAEL GOLDMAN, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 93-94 (Ann Chih Lin ed., 2002)
(suggesting that moral arguments against the death penalty are rooted in intellectual
opinions). Morality debates regarding the death penalty are "[u]nlike the deterrence
debate ... [because] this difference of opinion is purely intellectual in nature: people who
feel that capital punishment is immoral will hold that opinion regardless of the efficacy of
the death penalty at achieving societal goals." Id. at 93.
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The finality of capital punishment makes new constitutional rulings in
this area extremely significant. Constitutional modifications to death
penalty jurisprudence oblige courts to grapple with the application of
new rules, particularly when considering capital punishment cases on
collateral review.' However, a problem arises when the implications of
these new rulings are unclear, as this makes retroactive application
tedious and uncertain, and impacts the soundness of a court's opinion atS6
the possible expense of a defendant's life. In general, new constitutional
rulings that are construed as substantive apply retroactively, while
decisions considered merely procedural do not.7 Retroactive application
of a new rule is extremely significant because it directly affects the
"rights and expectations of an accused."" Sorting through the
complicated legal quagmire created by new constitutional rulings
requires application of intricate, technical doctrines. 9 When dealing with
capital punishment, determining the retroactivity of new constitutional
rulings is all the more significant because lives, not just rules, are at
stake.'0
4. See Steiker, supra note 2, at 1475-77 (arguing that the Ring decision, along with
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), was an "unprecedented [shift] in the 'modern era'
of the death penalty"). These two decisions significantly impacted death penalty
jurisprudence by altering it both "doctrinally and atmospherically." Id. at 1476-77.
5. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1097 (indicating the novelty among American courts
of applying "newly announced constitutional rule[s] . . . on collateral review"). The
Summerlin court analyzed the evolution of courts' consideration of the retroactivity of
judicial determinations to begin its own retroactivity determination. Id. Under common
law, the retroactivity dilemma "never arose because judges were believed to be
discovering rules rather than declaring them." Id. However, as the Supreme Court
started recognizing state prisoners' federal constitutional claims, discussions on retroactive
application of new constitutional rules emerged. Id. Ultimately, "[t]he expanding scope
of federal review, coupled with a significant increase in the filing of federal habeas
petitions by state prisoners, provided the Supreme Court with the opportunity to review
for the first time a number of alleged constitutional deprivations." Id.
6. See Steiker, supra note 2, at 1481 (speculating that the Ring case will create
numerous uncertainties regarding sentencing schemes and logical extensions of its
holding).
7. See discussion infra Part I.B.
8. Gary Knapp, Annotation, Supreme Court's Views as to Retroactive Effect of its
Own Decisions Announcing New Rules as to Sentencing in Criminal Cases, 122 L. ED. 2d
837, 841 (1997) (suggesting that proper determination of whether a new rule of criminal
sentencing should be given retroactive application is vital to protecting the rights and
expectations of the accused, as well as the state and federal criminal law systems).
9. See Adam Liptak, U.S. Court Overturns 100 Death Sentences; Judges, Not Juries,
Had Set the Penalties, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 4, 2003, at 4 (stating that the decision to
apply Ring retroactively hinged on "the application of complicated and technical doctrines
about when newly announced constitutional principles must be applied retroactively").
10. See Summerin, 341 F.3d at 1123 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (expressing an
impassioned opinion regarding retroactive application of new rules to the death penalty).
Judge Reinhardt questioned his colleagues' purported belief that "it is perfectly proper for
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On September 2, 2003, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reevaluated
Ring v. Arizona," a 2002 Supreme Court case, and delivered its opinion
in Summerlin v. Stewart, which offered a novel approach to retroactive
application of new constitutional rulings in "final" death penalty cases. 2
By classifying Ring as a "substantive" rule of law, the Ninth Circuit
invited controversy by directly conflicting with the Eleventh Circuit's
holding, in Turner v. Crosby,3 that Ring constituted a new procedural
rule of law. 4 Furthermore, the Summerlin court's implicit overturning of
more than 100 prisoners' death sentences attracted the attention of the
United States Supreme Court with its December 1, 2003 grant of
certiorari and June 24, 2004 decision.
5
This Comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision in Surnmerlin v.
Stewart, which provides an innovative interpretation of the Supreme
Court's 2002 case, Ring v. Arizona. First, this Comment introduces the
general theory of retroactivity of new constitutional rulings and the key
language and elements involved in the technical application of
retroactivity. Next, this Comment addresses the statutory environment
affecting petitions for writs of habeas corpus in death penalty cases, and
describes the specific components of Arizona's unconstitutional capital
sentencing statute at issue in Ring v. Arizona. Further, this Comment
the state to execute individuals who were deprived of their constitutional right to have a
jury make their death penalty decisions, if the judicial machinery had brought the direct
appeal . . . to an end before the day on which the Supreme Court recognized its
constitutional error." Id.
11. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
12. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1106.
13. 339 F.3d 1247 (11th Cir. 2003).
14. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102; Turner, 339 F.3d at 1286 (holding that Ring does not
apply retroactively on collateral review because it is a new procedural rule of law).
15. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833-34 (2003) (granting certiorari to
questions one and two of the petition); Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2526 (2004)
(deciding that Ring's holding is properly classified as procedural). Legal analysts had
suggested that the Court would grant Arizona's petition for certiorari. See Charles Lane,
Death Row Inmates Get Legal Break; Federal Appeals Court Overturns Sentences in More
Than 100 Cases, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2003, at A01 (summarizing speculation from legal
analysts that "[t]he large number of death sentences involved, and the fact that other
federal appeals courts have reached contrary rulings, mean that the Supreme Court
probably will agree to intervene") cf Saved, Perhaps, ECONOMIST, Sept. 6, 2003, at 29
(playing down the significance of the Summerlin ruling by stating that lawyers disagree on
the impact of the decision). While "[s]ome argue that the 111 death-row prisoners in
Arizona, Idaho and Montana who are directly affected would automatically have their
sentences commuted to life ...the Arizona attorney general's office says that new
sentencing hearings, with juries, would be set up.") Id.. see also Frank J. Murray, Court
Puts Death Sentences in Doubt; 9th Circuit Voids Judges' Punishment, WASH. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2003, at A10 (quoting Richard Dieter, executive director of the Death Penalty
Information Center as saying, "I think the United States Supreme Court will have to
resolve this before there will be any resentencings in any of these states.").
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examines the case precedent leading to Ring v. Arizona before reviewing
Ring and the Court's holding that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme
violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by allowing a judge to
find aggravating factors needed to impose the death penalty. Then, this
Comment identifies and analyzes the key cases, including Summerlin v.
Stewart and Turner v. Crosby, in which the United States circuit courts
have attempted to clarify and apply the Supreme Court's decision in
Ring. Following this discussion, this Comment explains the implications
of the Supreme Court's decision to overrule Summerlin in Schriro v.
Summerlin, and ultimately clarify Ring. Finally, this Comment concludes
that despite being overruled by the High Court, the Ninth Circuit's
pioneering decision in Summerlin reached the proper result in light of the
severity of its subject-the death penalty.
I. THE RETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE
The doctrine of retroactivity arises when courts seek to apply new
rules to old cases. 6 The doctrine strives to align the utility of the old rule
with the purpose of the new rule, while factoring in the fundamental
element of fairness. 7 In evaluating the retroactive application of a new
constitutional rule, courts consider certain principles, including "the
purpose to be served by the new standards, the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards [affected by the new
rule], and the effect on the administrant of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards.""' In this way, when the Supreme
Court deems a state's capital sentencing scheme unconstitutional, state
legislatures often must quickly conform their old laws to the Court's new
law.'9
16. See Christopher S. Strauss, Comment, Collateral Damage: How the Supreme
Court's Retroactivity Doctrine Affects Federal Drug Prisoners' Apprendi Claims on
Collateral Review, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1220, 1221 (2003) (stating that essentially,
"[r]etroactivity asks 'what to do when the law changes?' When a judicial decision changes
the law, the question of retroactivity boils down to how a rule announced in a given case
should govern other [previous] cases.").
17. See Knapp, supra note 8, at 843-45.
18. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 544 (1982); see also Strauss, supra note 16,
at 1221.
19. See Eric J. Beane, Note, When It Comes to Capital Sentencing, You Be the Judge:
Ring v. Arizona, 45 ARIz. L. REV. 225, 230 (2003) (pointing out various states' attempts to
make their own laws comply with the Court's ruling in Ring). After Ring, most of the
states whose statutes fit into the unconstitutional statutory scheme "revised their laws
quickly," and in Arizona, Attorney General Janet Napolitano advised the judges in her
state to halt capital case sentencing until new laws could be written. Id. at 230. Arizona
Governor Jane Hull even called a special session to rewrite the statute to conform with
Ring. Id.; see also Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Ruling Roils Death Penalty Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2002, at A14 (describing several state legislatures' quick response to Ring
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Considerable issues arise, however, when new constitutional rulings
affect a final judgment for an inmate on death row.2 ' Generally, new
rules of substantive criminal law are presumptively retroactive, making
the classification of the rule as substantive extremely significant to the
inmate seeking its application on collateral review.' In contrast, inmates
typically cannot use new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to
argue their conviction on collateral review (although narrow exceptions
may exist for the rule's retroactive application).22
Because the Supreme Court often fails to specifically categorize its
rulings as either procedural or substantive, lower courts struggle to
classify the nature of the Court's decisions.23  Even if a lower court
determines that a rule is procedural, the court still must consider the
exceptions to the rule in determining whether to lift the retroactivity
bar.24 The technical nature of classifying new constitutional rules forces
courts to carefully analyze retroactivity, all the while recognizing that
such a classification directly impacts an inmate's chance of escaping the
21
death penalty.
by convening special sessions to fix their capital sentencing schemes and requiring juries to
make the requisite factual determinations to apply the death penalty).
20. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003)
(articulating a concern with the insurmountable arbitrariness of "executing people because
their cases came too early-because their appeals ended before the Supreme Court
belatedly came to the realization that it had made a grievous constitutional error in its
interpretation of death penalty law").
21. See Santana-Madera v. United States, 260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 2000) (maintaining that "a new rule
of substantive criminal law is presumptively retroactive because a defendant may have
been 'punished for conduct that simply is not illegal"') (quoting Bilzerian v. United States,
127 F.3d 237, 242 (2d Cir. 1997)).
22. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997) ("[I1n general, 'new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
become final before the new rules are announced."') (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 310 (1989)); see also Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109-10 (articulating the two narrow
exceptions for retroactive application of new procedural rules).
23. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1096-97 (pointing out that the Supreme Court did not
decide in Ring whether the new law applied to petitioners who raised the "challenge in
collateral post-conviction proceedings rather than on direct appeal," therefore leaving
lower courts to grapple with the inquiry).
24. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1284-86 (11th Cir. 2003) (demonstrating one
court's steps in evaluating the retroactivity of Ring). First, the Eleventh Circuit termed
Ring procedural. Id. at 1284. Then, the court evaluated Ring under the two exceptions to
the retroactivity bar in Teague and determined that Ring did not fall within these
loopholes. Id. at 1285. Therefore, the new constitutional rule did not apply to Turner's
case on collateral review, and the court affirmed the denial of his petition for writ of
habeas corpus. Id. at 1286.
25. See Liptak, supra note 9.
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A. The Threshold Issue: Distinguishing Between Procedure and
Substance
The Supreme Court established its modern approach to the
26retroactivity of new procedural constitutional rules in Teague v. Lane.
In Teague, the Court developed a clearer framework for determining the
retroactive application of new procedural rules.27 Frank Teague, the
petitioner, sought on appeal to benefit from a Supreme Court opinion
issued after his final conviction."' The Court set forth a new framework
for retroactivity, and, based on these guidelines, found that the petitioner
could not apply the new constitutional rule to his final conviction. TheCourt held that new constitutional rules of criminal procedure are not
26. 489 U.S. 288 (1989): see also RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 769 (2d ed. 2001) (claiming that Teague
"'substantially altered the nature of that 'final say' given to the federal habeas courts.')
(quoting LAFAVE & ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(a) (2d ed. 1999)).
27. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (stating that the Court believes its "approach to
retroactivity for cases on collateral review requires modification."); see also Casey Laffey,
Note, The Death Penalty and the Sixth Amendment: How Will the System Look After Ring
v. Arizona?, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 371, 393 (2003) (suggesting that the Court's concerns
about inconsistent application of retroactivity led it to develop "a clear procedure for
determining when laws should be applied retroactively.").
28. Teague, 489 U.S. at 294. Teague was "convicted by an all-white ... jury of three
counts of attempted murder, two counts of armed robbery, and one count of aggravated
battery." Id. at 292-93. During jury selection, the prosecutor used all ten peremptory
challenges to exclude every black individual from the jury pool by claiming that he was
seeking a balance of men and women. Id. at 293. Various appellate proceedings ensued,
during which the Supreme Court issued a new ruling in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986), which held that the defendant first must make a prima facie case of discrimination
before the burden shifts back to the prosecution to offer a race-neutral explanation. Id. at
294-95. Teague argued that he should be permitted to use this rule on direct appeal, but
the Court denied his argument and refused to retroactively apply the Batson rule to
Teague's case. Id. at 294-96.
29. Id. at 316. The dissenting Justices argued that their colleagues improperly
established these new federal habeas guidelines. Id. at 326 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissenters claimed that the majority ignored stare decisis and thirty-five years of the
Court's "delineating the broad scope of habeas relief." Id. For Justice Brennan, the Court
went too far in Teague:
Out of an exaggerated concern for treating similarly situated habeas petitioners
the same, the plurality would for the first time preclude the federal courts from
considering on collateral review a vast range of important constitutional
challenges; where those challenges have merit, it would bar the vindication of
personal constitutional rights and deny society a check against further violations
until the same claim is presented on direct review. In my view, the plurality's
'blind adherence to the principle of treating like cases alike' amounts to 'letting
the tail wag the dog' when it stymies the resolution of substantial and unheralded
constitutional questions.
Id. at 326-27 (quoting Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 332 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
1096 [Vol. 53:1091
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S 3')
retroactive unless they fall into one of two exceptions. Essentially, an
exception applies if its absence would make it more difficult to assure an
accurate conviction or if it would alter the fairness of the criminal
proceeding.3' Therefore, the threshold question after Teague focuses on
whether the new constitutional rule is substantive or procedural.32  A
finding that a rule is procedural requires a Teague exception analysis,•31
while the "retroactivity bar" does not apply to new substantive rules.
B. The Technicalities of a Retroactive Determination
Courts grapple with the technical nature of the terms and rules
inherent in the retroactivity doctrine when determining whether a newconsituionl rue aplis • 34
constitutional rule applies retroactively. A host of issues confront
courts' analysis of retroactive rules, such as whether a Supreme Court
decision announces a new rule at all.35  In general, a Supreme Court
judgment announces a new rule when it "breaks new ground or imposes
a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government., 36 In other
words, "a case announces a new rule if the result was not dictated by
precedent existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final.,
37
Effectively, Ring constituted a new rule because it forced states with
30. Id. Under Teague, two exceptions to the general ban on retroactivity of new
constitutional rulings exist. Id. at 310-11. First, a new procedural rule should be applied
retroactively if it places "'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe."' Id. at 311 (quoting Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971)). Second, a new constitutional, procedural rule
should be retroactively applied when it fundamentally alters the concepts of ordered
liberty. Id.; see also Annotation, En Banc Ninth Circuit Says Ring Rule on Capital
Sentencing Applies Retroactively, 72 U.S.L.W. 1118-19 (Sept. 9, 2003) (summarizing the
Teague exceptions) [hereinafter Ring Rule].
31. Teague, 489 U.S. at 300 (stating that to ensure "evenhanded justice," retroactivity
should be considered a "threshold question").
32. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub
nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (laying out the court's first analytical
step, "consider[ing] the threshold Teague question, namely whether Ring announced a
substantive rule or a procedural rule"); see also McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245,
1256 (11th Cir. 2001).
33. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1099; see also supra note 21.
34. See Liptak, supra note 9 (stating that the Summerlin decision to apply Ring
retroactively hinged on "the application of complicated and technical doctrines about
when newly announced constitutional principles must be applied retroactively").
35. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 301 (demonstrating that even the Supreme Court admits
that it is "often difficult to determine when a case announces a new rule, and [they] do not
attempt to define the spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for
retroactivity purposes"); cf Beane, supra note 19, at 231 (suggesting that a lower court's
proper analysis of the federal retroactivity doctrine should start with determining whether
the Court in fact announced a new rule).
36. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
37. Id.
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certain death penalty schemes, like Arizona's, to rewrite its statutes.
However, once a lower court establishes that the Supreme Court has
announced a new rule, the detailed classification of that rule as
procedural or substantive remains; such a consideration directly impacts
the rule's retroactive applicability to cases on collateral review.39
Unfortunately for the courts, the distinction between substantive and
procedural rules is not necessarily easy to discern. Although the
Supreme Court has acknowledged the complexity of making this
determination, it has not established guidelines to aid lower courts in
classifying decisions as substantive or procedural.4' In fact, with Ring v.
Arizona, the Supreme Court seemingly made it more difficult for courts
to classify rules because the Court failed to distinguish its own rule as
substantive or procedural. 2
Generally, a new rule must affect the process of a criminal trial to be
procedural.43 A procedural rule inserts itself into the function of a trial
and alters the operation of the court proceeding. 44  In contrast,
substantive rules "reach beyond issues of procedural function and
38. See Laffey, supra note 27, at 394-95 (declaring that Ring clearly announced a new
rule because it imposed a novel obligation on the states by overruling certain capital
sentencing statutes).
39. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 306-11 (adopting Justice Harlan's position that "new
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
become final before the new rules are announced"). The general bar on retroactivity
exists, in part, because retroactivity does not advance any deterrent purposes; rather, as
some argue, it "frustrates the judicial need for comity and finality," and overall, the costs
on the states outweigh the benefits. Beane, supra note 19, at 233.
40. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1099-00 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub
nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
41. See id. (recognizing that the Supreme Court has acknowledged the difficulty in
distinguishing between substantive and procedural decisions). The Supreme Court
somewhat justified this uncertainty by stating that "'[we] would not suggest that the
distinction that we draw is an ironclad one that will invariably result in the easy
classification of cases in one category or the other."' Id. at 1100 (quoting Robinson v.
Neil, 409 U.S. 505,509 (1973)).
42. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). Nowhere in its opinion does the Supreme
Court classify its new constitutional rule. See id.; see also Steiker, supra note 2, at 1478-79
(reiterating that the "Ring Court was silent on the issue of the retroactivity of its
holding").
43. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 ("[T]he Supreme Court has understood decisions of
'criminal procedure' to be those decisions that implicate how the criminal trial process
functions.").
44. Id. A procedural law is one that "prescribe[s] the steps for having a right or duty
judicially enforced," while a substantive law "creates, defines, and regulates the rights,
duties, and powers of parties." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1221, 1443 (7th ed. 1999); see
also Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003). The Turner court designated
Ring a procedural rule because it "altered only who decides whether any aggravating
circumstances exist and, thus, altered only the fact-finding procedure." Id.
[Vol. 53:10911098
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address the meaning, scope, and application of substantive criminal
statutes., 45 A substantive rule of law affects the breadth and function of
46a criminal statute, rather than its mere operation. A rule that redefines
a law or adds a new requisite element to the law also may be classified as
substantive. In short, "a new rule is one of 'procedure' if it impacts the
operation of the criminal trial process, and a new rule is one of
'substance' if it alters the scope or modifies the applicability of a
substantive criminal statute., 48 Differentiating between a procedural rule
and a substantive rule may prove tedious, yet it is the threshold questionS 49
when considering whether the rule applies retroactively. A new
substantive rule of law is the key to unlock certain retroactive application
of that law on collateral review of a final death sentence.0
C. Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus and the Boundaries that Attempt
to Curb Them
Another factor federal courts consider when determining the
retroactivity of new constitutional rules is the inherent finality of
exhausted appeals.' Individuals who file a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus seek review of their "final" case and contend that despite their
conviction, their imprisonment violates the Constitution." While each
state employs its own procedure for collateral review, the process
45. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 ("noting that a Supreme Court holding is
'substantive' for Teague purposes when it impacts the scope and application of a
'substantive federal statute."') (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1101-02. For example, the Summerlin court classified the new Ring rule as
substantive because it redefined Arizona capital murder law. Id. at 1102.
48. Id. at 1100.
49. See id. at 1099.
50. See Liptak, supra note 9 (illustrating the dramatic result of classifying a new
constitutional rule as substantive). Because the Ninth Circuit designated Ring as
substantive, Ring applies retroactively to more than 100 prisoners in three states and
entitles each affected prisoner, "at a minimum, to a new sentencing proceeding, unless the
U.S. Supreme Court reverses that appeals court's decision." Id.
51. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 1264-65 (suggesting that an "interest in finality is
always present, even on direct appeal"). To preserve the interest in finality, courts restrict
either the availability of collateral review or the types of claims that courts can hear. Id.;
see also United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664, 667 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing
that "[t]he rule against retroactive application of new laws supports important interests of
finality that pertain to both the federal system and the state system").
52. See Larry W. Yackle, Capital Punishment, Federal Courts, and the Writ of Habeas
Corpus, in BEYOND REPAIR? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 62-64 (Stephen P. Garvey
ed., 2003) (explaining that defendants who claim violation of their rights cannot appeal
directly to a federal district court, but can petition the court for a writ of habeas corpus
under the theory that they are being imprisoned in violation of their constitutional rights).
20041 1.099
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typically commences with the filing of a petition in a state court:
Thereafter, various state appellate courts review the petition. Before
making a federal habeas claim, however, the petitioner first must exhaust
state remedies.55
Additionally, institutional limits curb a petitioner's ability to file for
writs of habeas corpus, and the Supreme Court and Congress ensure that
significant boundaries prevent frivolous claims that unduly tax the
federal court system. 6 Moreover, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) to limit federal
courts' ability to hear petitions for habeas relief.- The AEDPA
53. Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 219 (2002) (identifying the trial court origin for the
collateral review process).
54. Id. at 219-20 (stating that a petition remains "pending" until it "has achieved final
resolution through the State's post-conviction procedures").
55. Id. at 220 (clarifying that, statutorily, a "federal petitioner has not exhausted
those remedies as long as he maintains 'the right under the law of the State to raise' in that
State, 'by any available procedure, the question presented"').
56. See Yackle, supra note 52, at 68 (identifying some Court restraints on writs of
habeas corpus, including: a limit on the types of claims prisoners may bring; a limit on
federal courts' authority to hear a claim that was rejected by a state court; and specific
procedural steps the Court and Congress require a petitioner to take before making a
constitutional claim in federal court).
57. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214 (1996). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
amends numerous existing acts to prevent and punish acts of terrorism, as well as revises
proceedings of habeas corpus appeals for federal review of state criminal convictions
(particularly focusing on death penalty cases). See generally id. For example, section 101
amends subsection (d) to 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by affixing explicit constraints on the one-year
"period of limitation" in which "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state
court" can apply for a writ of habeas corpus. § 101, 110 Stat. at 1217. The extensive
AEDPA has several purposes:
One focus of the AEDPA was to restrict habeas corpus relief available in the
federal courts. In addition to restricting such relief by mandating further federal
court deference to state court adjudications, imposing a one-year period of
limitation on filings, and establishing for the first time special procedures for
death penalty cases in qualified jurisdictions, the AEDPA dramatically changed
both the procedural and substantive law governing second and successive ...
applications. As to procedures, the AEDPA assigned the circuit courts a unique
"gatekeeping" function under which they must grant authorization before a
petitioner can even file a successive application in a district court. As to the
substantive law, most significantly the AEDPA: limited to only two the diverse
reasons constituting "cause" excusing a petitioner's failure to bring a claim in a
prior application; heightened the degree of prejudice that a petitioner must
establish to obtain relief based on a claim relying on newly discovered evidence;
and eliminated the miscarriage of justice exception for petitioners who fail to
demonstrate both cause for failing to raise a claim in a prior petition and
prejudice from the failure to address the claim.
Randal S. Jeffrey, Successive Habeas Corpus Petitions and Section 2255 Motions After the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: Emerging Procedural and
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significantly narrowed the situations in which a prisoner can successively
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by requiring that the claim be based
on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactively applicable on
collateral review, or that the claim be based on newly discovered
evidence."' For habeas petitions filed before the statute's effective date
in 1996, pre-AEDPA law and case precedent governs, providing courts
with a more flexible standard to determine whether to "entertain" the
claim.' 9
D. Aggravating Factors: An Illustration of the Courts' Debate
The courts' struggle to classify rules manifests itself in the Supreme
Court's treatment of aggravating factors under Arizona's death penalty
sentencing scheme in Ring v. Arizona.a Prior to Ring, Arizona required
Substantive Issues, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 43, 43-45 (2000); see also Benjamin R. Orye 111,
Note, The Failure of Words: Habeas Corpus Reform, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act, and When a Judgment of Conviction Becomes Final for the Purpose of 28
U.S.C. § 2255(1), 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 441, 453-55 (2002) (reviewing some of the
legislative history of the AEDPA). First, habeas reform intended to "restore the public
confidence in the judicial system." Id. at 453. Second, Congress recognized the burden on
the federal courts from "frivolous, unnecessary petitions" and the AEDPA aimed to
quash some of those proceedings. Id. Third, Congress acknowledged the significance of
"finality" in death penalty cases by establishing a "reasonable filing deadline." Id. at 454.
But cf GOLDMAN. supra note 3, at 25 (identifying some critics' arguments that the
AEDPA is virtually ineffective and that it does not go far enough in "restricting the
authority of federal appellate courts to defy state court decisions by prolonging the
appeals process").
58. See Jeffrey, supra note 57. at 125-26. Prior to the enactment of the AEDPA, new
claims could be raised in habeas petitions "if the petitioner could demonstrate either (1)
cause for failing to raise the claim previously and prejudice from failing to consider the
claim or (2) that a miscarriage of justice would result from the failure to consider the
claim." Id. at 125. The AEDPA replaced these flexible standards by authorizing only two
circumstances in which claims could be presented in successive applications:
[T]he claim must be based on either (1) a rule of constitutional law, which the
Supreme Court has made retroactively applicable on collateral review, and which
was previously unavailable: or (2) newly discovered evidence, which at least in
the § 2254 context, supports a claim of a constitutional error, and if proven.
would demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable
factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 126.
59. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082. 1096 n.4 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted
sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (noting that "[b]ecause the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether Ring should be applied retroactively, the analysis of the
retroactively [sic] of Ring under AEPDA [sic] and Teague is necessarily distinct"); id. at
1092 (indicating that because Summerlin filed his petition before the AEDPA's effective
date, pre-AEDPA law governed the petition): Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1273 (11th
Cir. 2003) (establishing that because Turner filed his petition prior to the effective date of
the AEDPA, his petition was governed by pre-AEDPA law); see also Jeffrey, supra note
57, at 126.
60. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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judges, not juries, to determine the presence of aggravating
circumstances required to impose the death penalty.6' Although the
Sixth Amendment provides the right to a jury trial, this guarantee did not
extend to the determination of such aggravating factors until Ring. 2
Depending on the circuit, Ring's designation of the jury, and not the
judge, as arbiter of aggravating factors was either procedural or
substantive. 3 Procedural arguments contended that altering the death-
sentence statutory scheme only varied the fact-finding procedure, while
substantive proponents maintained that the modification redefined
Arizona capital murder law.64 The fallout from Ring illuminated the
complexity of the retroactivity doctrine, and courts' divergence over
Ring's application demonstrates that retroactive application requires
intricate and careful consideration.
II. THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF RING V. ARIZONA: CASE PRECEDENT
AND COURT CONFUSION
After Teague, lower courts recognized the need to classify new
constitutional rules as substantive or procedural, but found difficulty in• • • 65
drawing the distinction. The body of case law emerging from the
Supreme Court confused lower courts, as they attempted to reconcile the
Court's seemingly contradictory holdings. In particular, the Court's
61. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(F)(I)-(10) (West 2001); see also Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002).
62. See Laffey, supra note 27, at 371; see also Thomas Aumann, Note, Death by Peers:
The Extension of the Sixth Amendment to Capital Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 845, 848-50 (2003) (assessing that although the Sixth Amendment requires
that a jury must find all elements of a defendant's crime beyond a reasonable doubt, "the
Court has struggled to define precisely what constitutes an essential element.").
Furthermore, sentencing factors had been exempt from a jury determination beyond a
reasonable doubt and. therefore, "[liegislatures often attempt[ed] to label a determinative
fact as a sentencing factor to avoid having it treated as an element of the crime." Id. at
850.
63. Cf. Aumann, supra note 62, at 852-54 (depicting the origin of the role of the jury
in American death penalty decisions, which may influence the way a court would consider
the Ring decision).
64. Compare Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1284 (11th Cir. 2003) (arguing that
Ring is procedural because it dictates what fact-finding method must be used to apply the
death penalty), with Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 (stating that Ring is substantive because
it redefined Arizona capital murder law and established different elements for different
forms of punishment).
65. See Strauss, supra note 16, at 1242 (arguing that one of the major difficulties with
the retroactivity doctrine is "the necessity of classifying a new rule as either procedural or
substantive").
66. See Laffey, supra note 27, at 372 (suggesting that a reason the Supreme Court
eventually agreed to hear Ring was for the opportunity to resolve its incompatible
holdings in Walton and Apprendi).
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holdings in three cases, Walton v. Arizona,6 7 Jones v. United States, 6 and
Apprendi v. New Jersey puzzled lower courts and virtually forced the
Supreme Court to make a definitive ruling to rectify this uncertainty]"
In Walton v. Arizona, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to
Arizona's capital sentencing statute.' After a first-degree murder
conviction, petitioner Jeffrey Walton underwent a separate sentencing
proceeding solely conducted by the trial judge, as required under
Arizona law.72 During the sentencing phase, the judge determined the
existence of two aggravating circumstances and sentenced Walton to
death.73
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Walton argued that "every finding of
fact underlying the sentencing decision must be made by a jury, not by a
judge," and therefore, Arizona's death penalty scheme was
unconstitutional.7 4 After a brief review of case precedent, the Court
succinctly denounced Walton's argument, holding that the Sixth
Amendment does not require a jury to determine the aggravating factors
necessary to invoke the death penalty. 75 Over the next decade, several
67. 497 U.S. 639 (1998).
68. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
69. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
70. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 497; Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-52; Walton, 497 U.S. at 649; see
also Laffey, supra note 27, at 375 (demonstrating lower courts' confusion with the
conflicting rulings). The Fourth Circuit found the Court's holdings "'perplexing,"' while
the Ninth Circuit determined that Apprendi called into question the Court's holding in
Walton. Id. The circuits' confusion demonstrated that the Supreme Court "needed to
clarify the constitutionality of judicial determination of so-called capital sentencing factors
and overrule either Walton or Apprendi." Id. at 376.
71. See Walton, 497 U.S. at 647-52.
72. Id. at 645.
73. Id. The Court found two aggravating factors: "(1) The murder was committed 'in
an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner,' and (2) the murder was committed for
pecuniary gain." Id. (citations omitted). The Court considered mitigating factors,
including Walton's age (he was twenty years of age at sentencing) and his capacity to
appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct, but these factors were insufficient "to call for
leniency." Id.
74. Id. at 647. Walton contended that constitutional implementation of the Arizona
statute required the jury to determine the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors,
and then the trial judge would impose a sentence based on those findings. Id. In
immediate foreclosure of this argument, the Supreme Court stated that, "'[a]ny argument
that the Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the
findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior
decisions of this Court."' Id. (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 728, 745 (1990)).
75. Id. at 648-49. In reaching its conclusion, the Court found that aggravating
circumstances are not necessarily "'elements of the offense."' Id. at 648. Rather,
aggravating circumstances are guidelines that aid in choosing between a death sentence
and life in prison. Id.; see also Beane, supra note 19, at 226 (interpreting the Walton
Court's rationale to suggest that "[I]f the judge's sentencing considerations neither require
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Supreme Court opinions diluted the strength of Walton's holding, but it
remained binding law until the Court expressly overruled it in 2002, with
Ring v. Arizona.6
In 1999, the Supreme Court considered Jones v. United States to
evaluate the constitutionality of a federal carjacking sentencing statute.7
After an indictment on two counts of carjacking with a firearm,
petitioner Nathaniel Jones was arraigned and informed by the magistrate
judge that he faced a maximum sentence of fifteen years.' A jury
convicted Jones on both counts, and the district court later sentenced
him to twenty-five years of imprisonment based on a presentencing
investigation indicating that one of the victims had suffered bodily
injury. 9 Jones objected, claiming that the government neglected to prove
serious bodily injury to the jury.8 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit found that the trial court had the discretion to determine bodily
harm and to sentence Jones to twenty-five years in prison."'
nor preclude a death penalty verdict . .. the defendant is in no sense convicted or
acquitted by the finding of those circumstances" and the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights are not violated). But see id. at 708-14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with his
colleagues and determining that the Sixth Amendment does in fact entitle a defendant to a
jury finding of facts required to impose the death penalty because of the historical
significance of the jury).
76. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002). Prior to Ring, several Supreme Court
decisions weakened the Walton decision. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey. 530 U.S. 466,
497 (2000) (further complicating Walton's meaning by holding that New Jersey's statutory
system allowing a judge to make findings that enhance a defendant's sentence, is "an
unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our
criminal justice system"); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 248 (1999) (confusing the
Walton decision by finding that a Sixth Amendment issue is raised when a jury is
prevented from deciding facts that determine a sentencing range); Beane, supra note 19, at
227 (explaining that despite new case law tending to overrule Walton, the apparent legal
contradictions remained): see also John M. Challis, Note, I'm Sorry Your Honor, You Will
Not Decide My Fate Today: The Role of Judges in the Imposition of the Death Penalty: A
Note on Ring v. Arizona, 22 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv 521, 537 (2003) (observing that the
Court's jurisprudence prior to Ring virtually required the Court to remedy the confusion
and "answer the question of the applicability of Walton after Jones and Apprendi" because
these decisions, "read in concert with each other, made absolutely no sense").
77. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. The Court considered whether the federal carjacking
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, defined three distinct offenses or a single crime with three
possible maximum penalties dependent on additional factors. Id.
78. Id. at 230-31.
79. Id. at 231. One of the victims suffered a perforated eardrum and permanent
hearing loss after being struck by a gun during the commission of the crime. Id. Under 18
U.S.C. § 2119(2), serous bodily injury occurring as a result of the crime allows a defendant
to be sentenced for twenty-five years. Id. at 230.
80. Id. at 231.
81. Id. at 231-32. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court's structural interpretation of § 2119(2). Id. The Ninth Circuit found that Congress
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The Supreme Court reversed the lower court, finding that "the fairest
reading of [the carjacking statute] treats the fact of serious bodily harm
as an element, not a mere enhancement." 2  The Court found that
removing the jury's control over facts that determine a statutory
sentencing range raises a Sixth Amendment issue. 3 Furthermore, the
Court held that the federal carjacking statute consisted of three separate
elements, each of which needed proof beyond a reasonable doubt as
determined by the jury.4 Though it did not specify whether this decision
should apply retroactively, the Court's line of reasoning paved the way
for further rulings on statutory schemes that increase penalties without
jury deliberation."'
Ten years after Walton, the Supreme Court created confusion among
lower courts with a seemingly contradictory holding in Apprendi v. New
Jersey.8 In Apprendi, the Court invalidated a state statute that allowed a
judge to impose a sentence for a first-degree crime despite a defendant's
second-degree conviction by a jury. The Court found that because the
did not intend for the subsections of the statute to constitute individual crimes, but rather
to constitute sentencing factors. Id. at 231-32.
82. Id. at 239. The Court "recognize[d] the possibility of the other view," but avoided
the issue by adopting the theory that "'where a statute is susceptible of two constructions,
by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of
which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter."' Id. (quoting United
States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).
83. Id. at 248. The Court found that under the circumstances in Jones, "there is
reason to suppose that ... the relative diminution of the jury's significance would merit
Sixth Amendment concern." Id. The Court also was concerned "that diminishment of the
jury's significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range
would resonate with the claims of earlier controversies, to raise a genuine Sixth
Amendment issue not yet settled." Id.
84. Id. at 252: see also Aumann, supra note 62, at 871 (depicting the Court's rationale
as a "maximum punishment test"). A sentence enhancer should be considered an element
of the crime when it raises the maximum punishment available for the crime and as a
separate element when it must receive jury deliberation beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
85. See supra note 66.
86. See 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Laffey, supra note 27, at 375. The author argues that:
Subsequent courts have struggled with Walton's continued applicability in light
of Apprendi. The Fourth Circuit has called it "perplexing" that a jury is required
for factual findings of drug quantities while they are not essential for determining
the presence or absence of aggravating factors justifying imposition of a capital
sentence. In addition, the Ninth Circuit stated that although "Apprendi may
raise some doubt about Walton," the lower courts are still required to apply
Walton to capital cases until the Supreme Court expressly overrules it.
Id.
87. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491; see also Laffey, supra note 27, at 374 (summarizing
Apprendi's procedural history). Defendant Apprendi "pleaded guilty to two counts... of
second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose ... and one count of the
third-degree offense unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb." Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 469-70. Under New Jersey state law, a second-degree offense entails a five to ten year
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severity of the criminal system requires a jury to find "all facts necessary
to constitute a statutory offense," it was unconstitutional for a defendant- 88
to face punishment beyond statutory guidelines. Considering the
history of the right to a jury trial, the Court found the statute
unconstitutional because it "remov[ed] the jury from the determination
of a fact that, if found, exposes the criminal defendant to a penalty
exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." 9 The majority attempted to
align Apprendi with Walton, but some Justices found this reasoning
perplexing.9" Furthermore, the Apprendi Court left the issue of whether
its rule was procedural or substantive open to the interpretation of the
lower courts.9 ' Because the Supreme Court essentially extended its
sentence, and a third-degree offense provides a three to five year sentence. Id. at 470.
Upon the state's motion for an extended term, based on Apprendi's alleged racial
motivations in the offense, the trial judge applied the hate-crime enhancement and
sentenced Apprendi to a twelve-year term of imprisonment. Id. at 471. On appeal, the
Supreme Court found this sentence unconstitutional because the procedure "is an
unacceptable departure from the jury tradition that is an indispensable part of our
criminal justice system." Id. at 497.
88. Id. at 483-84; see also Andrew M. Levine, The Confounding Boundaries of
"Apprendi-land": Statutory Minimums and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 377, 414 (2001) (offering a formulation of the Apprendi rule: "that when the
finding of any fact (other than a prior conviction) has the effect, in real terms, of increasing
the maximum punishment or minimum punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range,
it must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt").
89. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83 (addressing the "historic link between verdict and
judgment and the consistent limitation on judges' discretion to operate within the limits of
the legal penalties").
90. Id. at 496-97. The Court argued that:
Neither the cases cited, nor any other case, permits a judge to determine the
existence of a factor which makes a crime a capital offense. What the cited cases
hold is that, once a jury has found the defendant guilty of all the elements of an
offense which carries as its maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be
left to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty, rather than a lesser
one, ought to be imposed .... The person who is charged with actions that
expose him to the death penalty has an absolute entitlement to jury trial on all
the elements of the charge.
Id. (quoting Almendaraz-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 257 n.2 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting)); cf id. at 540-41 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (indicating her discontent with the
majority's reasoning). According to Justice O'Connor, Apprendi "will surely be
remembered as a watershed change in constitutional law." Id. at 524. In Justice
O'Connor's view, the majority attempted to distinguish Apprendi from Walton by claiming
that in Arizona, "the jury makes all of the findings necessary to expose the defendant to a
death sentence." Id. at 538. Justice O'Connor found her colleagues' explanation
"baffling," and "demonstrably untrue," and slammed the majority for a seeming reliance
on "irrelevant historical evidence," which neglects the Court's own case precedent and
offers "unprincipled and inexplicable distinctions." Id. at 538-39.
91. Id. at 475. Perhaps the Court did not classify its decision because, "[t]he
substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus not an issue; the adequacy of New
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Apprendi ruling to the capital sentencing scheme at issue in Ring,
Apprendi's classification is relevant to lower courts' interpretation of
Ring.92
III. THE RING DECISION
In Ring v. Arizona, the Supreme Court issued an opinion causing
lower courts to speculate about its retroactivity3 Petitioner Thomas
Jersey's procedure is." Id. But see McCoy v. United States. 266 F.3d 1245, 1272 (11th Cir.
2001) (Barkett, J., concurring) (offering an interpretation of the Supreme Court's
statement). In the context of its decision, that statement suggests that "[t]he Court was
simply saying ... that the constitutionality of the 'substantive basis' of the penalty
enhancement -racial bias-was not before the [C]ourt." Id., see also Summerlin v.
Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1101 (9th Cir. 2003). cert. granted sub nora. Schriro v. Summerlin,
124 S. Ct. 833 (2003) (concluding that Apprendi was in fact procedural); United States v.
Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002) (opining that although Apprendi is "doubtless
an extremely important decision," it is merely a decision that shifts the fact-finding duties
and is therefore procedural). But see McCoy, 266 F.3d at 1272 (Barkett, J., concurring)
(observing that Apprendi creates a new substantive law). Although Judge Barkett
concurred with the court's result, he found that the majority "misse[d] the mark entirely"
on the classification of Apprendi. Id. at 1271-72; cf. United States v. Clark, 260 F.3d 382,
385 (5th Cir. 2001) (Parker, J., dissenting) (admitting that cases, such as Apprendi, are not
always easily classified as substantive or procedural). Depending on the interpretation of
Apprendi:
If the new rule gleaned from [it] is the holding that every element of a crime
must be submitted to the jury, then it is a procedural rule which should be
analyzed under Teague standards. If, on the other hand, Apprendi is read as
refining the definition of an element of a federal offense, it is a substantive
decision.
Id.; cf. Strauss, supra note 16. at 1243-45 (describing the difficulty with classifying
Apprendi because it can be considered "an old procedural rule that has, in operation,
created a new element of a substantive criminal offense").
92. See Laffey, supra note 27, at 380 (indicating that Ring applied Apprendi's holding
to capital and non-capital findings). Compare Levine, supra note 88, at 382-83 (arguing
for a broad application for Apprendi because it "supports a bright-line rule: Any fact
(other than a prior conviction) that has the effect, in real terms, of increasing the maximum
or minimum punishment beyond an otherwise applicable range must be submitted to a
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"), with Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 524 (2000)
(O'Connor, J.. dissenting) (setting forth that the Court has long realized that not every
fact relating to the defendant's punishment must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt).
Instead, the Court has:
[D]eclined to establish any bright-line rule for making such judgments and have
instead approached each case individually, sifting through the considerations
most relevant to determining whether the legislature has acted properly within
its broad power to define crimes and their punishments or instead has sought to
evade the constitutional requirements associated with the characterization of a
fact as an offense element.
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
93. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002); see also Ring Rule, supra note 30, at
1119 (indicating that the Ring Court did not determine whether their rule was substantive
or procedural, or "whether it is to be applied retroactively on collateral review," thereby
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Ring was convicted of felony murder during the course of an armed
robbery. 94 At the time of Ring's sentencing, Arizona's death penalty
statute required findings beyond felony murder for imposition of the
death penalty.9- During sentencing, the judge found two aggravating
circumstances: one, that Ring committed the offense to obtain money;
and two, that the crime was committed in a particularly heinous way; he
therefore, sentenced Ring to death.96 On appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court relied on Walton to find the State's capital sentencing scheme
constitutional. 9 Eventually, the Supreme Court granted Ring's petition
for a writ of certiorari to remedy the tension between its decisions in
Walton and Apprendi.9'
In Ring, the Court found Arizona's death penalty system, where judges
determined death penalty prerequisites, unconstitutional. The Court
implicitly leaving the issue open for interpretation by the lower courts); Aumann, supra
note 62. at 896 (explaining that Ring effected a "logistical nightmare regarding sentences
imposed under a judicial determination of aggravating factors"). Ring voided five states'
death sentencing schemes, created lower court confusion about its precise holding. and
"fuel[ed] a growing national debate over the continued imposition of the death penalty."
Id. at 896-99; Challis, supra note 76, at 536-37 (demonstrating Ring's impact by pointing
out that there has been a remarkable number of state statutes affected by Ring).
94. Ring, 536 U.S. at 591. Ring's actions began on November 28, 1994, when a Wells
Fargo armored vehicle made a routine stop at an Arizona department store. Id. at 589.
When the Wells Fargo courier returned to his vehicle after picking up the money in the
store, he found the van and its driver missing. Id. Later in the day, local police authorities
found the Wells Fargo van locked, with its engine running, in a church parking lot. Id.
Inside the vehicle was the driver who had died from a single gunshot to the head. Id.
Over $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in checks were missing from the van. Id. Based on an
informant's tip, police investigated Ring's involvement, and at trial, the jury deadlocked
on the charge of premeditated-murder but convicted Ring of felony-murder in the course
of armed robbery. Id. at 589, 591.
95. Id. at 592. Ring was convicted of felony murder, not premeditated murder;
therefore, he could only receive the death penalty if he was the victim's killer or if he was
a major participant in the robbery and exhibited a "reckless disregard or indifference for
human life." Id. at 594. The judge used testimony from Ring's sentencing to determine
that Ring was the victim's killer and a major participant in the armed robbery. Id.
96. Id. at 594-95. The judge found that Ring committed the offense in expectation of
receiving something of pecuniary value, by murdering the victim in order to steal the cash
from the armored car. Id. In determining that Ring committed the offense in a
particularly cruel or heinous way, the judge relied on Ring's apparent "pride in his
marksmanship." Id. at 595; see also id. at n.1 (listing aggravating factors required to
impose a death sentence under Arizona law).
97. Ring, 536 U.S. at 596 (referring to the Supremacy Clause as the basis for the
Arizona Supreme Court's reliance on Walton).
98. Id. at 596-97.
99. Id. at 609. The precise question before the Court was "whether [an] aggravating
factor may be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies, or whether the Sixth
Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires that the aggravating factor determination be entrusted to the jury."
Id. at 597. Ultimately, the Court ruled that it was unconstitutional for a "sentencing judge,
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determined its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence requires a jury, not a
judge, to ascertain the aggravating factors that would make a defendant
eligible for the death penalty." In addition, the Court clarified its own
precedent by extending its rationale in Apprendi and then applying it to
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme."" Aggravating factors are subject
to constitutional requirements and "must be found by the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."" 2 Although Arizona argued, in part, that requiring
judges to find aggravating factors could protect against the "arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty,""3 the Court responded that the Sixth
Amendment is not rooted in the "relative rationality, fairness, or
efficiency of potential factfinders."" The majority of states with capital
punishment require a jury to determine aggravating factors in capital
cases, which indicates that "the superiority of judicial factfinding in
capital cases is far from evident."" )' While recognizing the importance of
stare decisis, the Court acknowledged that case precedent is not
immovable and expressly overruled Walton."' With Ring, the Court
issued a "widely controversial and monumental decision" by deeming it
unconstitutional for statutes to assign a judge as the sole arbiter of
aggravating factors needed to impose the death penalty.'
7
The Court's decision rendering Arizona's death penalty statute
unconstitutional resolved the tension between Apprendi and Walton, but
established the groundwork for new conflicts. 8 In Ring, the Court left
several significant questions unanswered, "including how the new rule
affects defendants at various stages in the cases against them; whether
the decision requires actions in states where juries render advisory
verdicts; what new laws are required to fix the problem the court
sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the
death penalty." Id. at 609.
100. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609 (finding Arizona's judge-based system of aggravating factor
determination unconstitutional).
101. Id.; see also Ring Rule, supra note 30, at 1119 (suggesting that the Ring court
relied on its own rule in Apprendi and applied this logic to death penalty sentencing).
102. Ring, 536 U.S. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 607 (citations omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 607-08. The Court points to the fact that "[o]f the 38 States with capital
punishment, 29 generally commit sentencing decisions to juries." Id. at 608 n.6.
106. Id. at 608-09.
107. Laffey, supra note 27, at 399 (commenting that Ring will "'buy everyone on death
row in these ... states another 7.5 years of life. That's the average length of time it takes
to go from imposition of the death sentence to execution."').
108. See supra text accompanying note 98 (emphasizing the need for the Court's
resolution of Apprendi and Walton's incompatible holdings); see also infra text
accompanying note 109 (illustrating Ring's controversial consequences) (quoting Liptak,
supra note 19).
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identified; and what happens in cases like the one in Arizona. ' " '9 In
addition, Ring ignited another significant debate concerning the
retroactive application of its rule to prisoners on death row who have
already received a final verdict."" Nowhere in the Ring opinion did the
Court indicate whether this rule was procedural or substantive, a
designation that determines the retroactive applicability of its decision,
thereby forcing lower courts to interpret the ruling."'
IV. READING RING: CIRCUITS ATTEMPT TO INTERPRET THE CASE
After Ring, various federal circuits attempted to interpret the Supreme
Court's decision. The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits designated Ring as a
procedural rule, a decision that prevents application of the Ring rule on
collateral review.' -1 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit classified Ring as a
substantive rule, thereby permitting its use on collateral review. " ' These
circuits were at odds with their conflicting applications of Ring. An
examination of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Cannon v. Mullin, the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Turner v. Crosby, and the Ninth Circuit's
alternative decision in Summerlin v. Stewart exemplifies this split among
the circuits."
4
A. The Procedural Designation of Ring
In July 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued its
decision in Cannon v. Mullin and determined that Ring, like its
predecessor Apprendi, set forth a new rule of criminal procedure.' 5 In
Cannon, petitioner Randall Cannon was convicted of murder and arson,
and the judge sentenced him to death."6 After appealing, Cannon sought
109. Liptak, supra note 19. In addition, Ring effectively invalidated five states' death-
penalty sentencing statutes, including Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska.
Id. Furthermore, the decision called into question four other states' statutes, including
Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana, because those states require juries to offer
"advisory verdicts" but assign the ultimate decision to sentence the defendant to death to
the judges. Id.
110. Murray, supra note 15 (stating that the Ring ruling "pointedly did not specify
whether that procedure would be retroactively required").
111. Ring Rule, supra note 30 (indicating that the Ring court did not determine
whether its rule was substantive or procedural or "whether it is to be applied retroactively
on collateral review," leaving it open for the lower courts to make their own interpretation
of the law).
112. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Cannon v. Mullin, 297
F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1102 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 115, 121,127.
115. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994.
116. Id. at 991.
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a second petition for habeas corpus relief and an emergency application
for a stay of execution, claiming that Oklahoma's death penalty scheme
was unconstitutional under Ring because the jury did not find the factual
determinations required to impose the death penalty.' Cannon put
forth a two-fold argument, contending first that Ring announced a new
rule of substantive criminal law and second, that Ring applied
retroactively "through the combination of Teague, Ring, and cases
preceding Ring in the Apprendi line."'".. The Tenth Circuit rejected the
arguments, ruling that Cannon failed to make a prima facie showing that
the Supreme Court intended Ring to apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review."" The Tenth Circuit's ruling denied Cannon's habeas
petition and his emergency request for a stay, and implicitly set the tone
for the Eleventh Circuit's parallel ruling in Turner v. Crosby.""
One year later, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals heard Turner,
and similarly held that Ring announced a new rule of criminal procedure,
thereby concluding it did not apply retroactively."' A jury found William
Turner guilty on two counts of first-degree murder, and the judge
sentenced Turner to death based on his findings of aggravating• 122
circumstances. Turner appealed, arguing in part, that his sentence was
irreconcilable with Ring. 23 Without reaching the merits of his claim, the
Eleventh Circuit determined that as an extension of Apprendi, Ring is a
117. Id. at 990-92.
118. Id. at 992.
119. Id. at 994 (dismissing Cannon's claims because Ring is an "extension of Apprendi
to the death penalty context," and the Tenth Circuit previously determined that Apprendi
was procedural in United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2002); therefore, Ring is
a procedural rule as well).
120. Id. at 994-95. After denying Cannon's petition and his request for a stay, the
court verbalized the apparent finality of its ruling by stating that it is "not appealable and
cannot be the subject of a petition for rehearing or a writ of certiorari. Thus only the
Supreme Court, exercising its original jurisdiction, can make the decision necessary to
provide Cannon the relief he seeks." Id. at 995.
121. Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1283 (1 1th Cir. 2003); see also Arizona v.
Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003) (declaring that Ring is a procedural rule). In
Towery, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to apply Ring retroactively to four
petitioners convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 930. The court
reasoned that Ring "changed neither the underlying conduct that the state must prove to
establish that a defendant's crime warrants death nor the state's burden of proof." Id. at
833. Rather, Ring merely modified the fact-finding procedures, not who determines
aggravating circumstances, therefore announcing a procedural rule. Id.
122. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1261-69. The manner in which the murders were committed
was particularly gruesome. as Turner stabbed his wife twenty-two times and stabbed and
slashed the other victim fifty-one times, in front of witnesses. Id. at 1267-68. The judge
found numerous aggravating factors, including a prior capital felony conviction, the fact
that the felony was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, and that it was committed in a
cold and calculated way. Id.
123. Id. at 1273.
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procedural rule.' 24 It followed that as a procedural rule, Ring could not
be applied retroactively unless it fit into Teague's narrow exceptions,
which the court determined did not apply.2 5 Ultimately, the Eleventh
Circuit found that Turner could not apply Ring to his case on collateral
review, and denied his writ of habeas corpus.126
B. The Substantive Classification of Ring
Just a few short months after the Turner decision, the Ninth Circuit
broke from its fellow circuits and delivered a completely contrary, 127
ruling. In reviewing Summerlin v. Stewart, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals faced a horrific murder case riddled with counsel error, a
functionally retarded plaintiff, and a marijuana-addicted judge. 2
Summerlin's procedural history included various court proceedings,
inappropriate attorney relations, and numerous changes in counsel and
judges.129 Warren Summerlin's trial resulted in a jury conviction of first-
degree murder and sexual assault."" He was sentenced to death based on
the judge's finding of two aggravating circumstances: a prior felony
124. Id. at 1280.
125. Id. at 1284-85. Ring neither identified "certain kinds of primary, private
individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority," nor did
infringement of Ring's rule make a fair trial proceeding less likely. Id. at 1285.
126. Id. at 1286.
127. Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nor.
Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003). In the past, the Ninth Circuit has faced
criticism for its decisions. See Arthur D. Hellman, Getting it Right: Panel Error and the En
Banc Process in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 425, 426 (2000)
(criticizing the Ninth Circuit based on the Final Report of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals which stated that "the Ninth Circuit today
generates a disproportionate number of panel decisions that are wrong, and the existing en
banc process fails to provide the necessary corrective"). Senator Orrin Hatch, chairman of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, has asserted that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has "judges who are out of control, who are activist judges ignoring the law itself."
Id. at 431-32. See also infra text accompanying note 200 (identifying another criticism of a
decision of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit).
128. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1084.
129. Id. Summerlin first pled guilty to second-degree murder and aggravated assault
without admitting guilt. Id. at 1086. However, several days later, Summerlin withdrew
this plea and filed a motion to fire his public defender. Id. Meanwhile, Summerlin's
Public Defender, "Jane Roe," developed a romantic relationship with Summerlin's
prosecutor. Id. at 1086-87. Because of ethical implications and conflicts of interests, both
counsels were eventually replaced and a new judge was assigned. Id. at 1088. Summerlin's
final public defender, George Klink, purportedly provided ineffective assistance of counsel
because he failed to investigate Summerlin's "organic brain disfunction." Id. at 1093. This
Comment will not examine Summerlin's claims on appeal of ineffective counsel.
130. Id. at 1088.
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conviction and the heinous manner in which he committed the act. 3'
Later, during federal habeas proceedings, Summerlin's sentencing judge,
Philip Marquardt, was disbarred when it became known that he "was a
heavy user of marijuana.', 3 2 Summerlin exhausted his state remedies by
moving to vacate the judgment, amending habeas petitions and filing a
motion to stay the proceeding. 1 3 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit voted to rehear Summerlin's case en banc."*
Among Summerlin's numerous arguments on appeal was the
contention that the Arizona death penalty statute was unconstitutional
because it permitted a judge, not a jury, to determine the elements
necessary for a capital sentence.3  The Ninth Circuit began by finding
that Arizona's death penalty scheme was unconstitutional in light of Ring
v. Arizona because it "permits a judge rather than a jury to determine
the elements necessary for a death sentence.' 36 The court then faced the
pivotal question of whether Ring's "newly announced constitutional
rule" could be applied retroactively-a decision that would determine
the status of Summerlin's death penalty sentence.1
37
In undertaking an analysis of Ring, the Ninth Circuit considered
"whether others who received the same constitutionally infirm sentence.
. are eligible for the same relief or whether they should remain subject
to execution."'' First, the court considered the threshold Teague
question of whether Ring amounts to a substantive or procedural rule .
Because newly announced substantive constitutional rules are
presumptively retroactive, this classification would permit Summerlin to
131. Id. at 1090. Brenna Bailey, a delinquent account investigator for Finance
America, went to Summerlin's home to speak with his wife about an overdue account. Id.
at 1084. Ms. Bailey never returned to work, and later that day the police received an
anonymous phone call suggesting she had been murdered by Summerlin. Id. at 1084-85.
The next day, the police found Ms. Bailey's body "wrapped in a bloody bedsheet .... Her
skull was crushed, and she was partially nude." Id. at 1085. Although he was found
competent to stand trial, court-appointed psychiatrists deemed Summerlin "functionally
mentally retarded" and "deeply emotionally and mentally disturbed." Id. at 1085-86.
132. Id. at 1089, 1090 n.1. Although the amount of drugs that Judge Marquardt used
during the trial is unknown, the record supports the contention that Judge Marquardt
"was either having difficulty concentrating or experiencing short-term memory loss." Id.
at 1090.
133. Id. at 1091.
134. Id. at 1092.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1096.
137. Id. at 1097.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1099.
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use the Ring rule on collateral review. 14" Following an extensive analysis,
the Ninth Circuit found that "Ring is, as to Arizona, a 'substantive'
decision.""'
4
The Summerlin court went further, however, and provided an
independent basis for Ring's retroactivity.' 42  To ensure Ring's
applicability to Summerlin, the court determined that even if construed
as a procedural decision, "a full Teague analysis of the unique procedural
aspects of Ring provides an independent basis upon which to apply Ring
retroactively to cases on collateral review.""143 The court found that Ring
did not fit into Teague's first exception because it did not decriminalize
conduct or prevent capital punishment from applying to certain groups of
individuals.' 44 However, Ring fulfilled Teague's second requirement
because the new law: "(1) seriously enhance[d] the accuracy of the
proceeding and (2) alter[ed] our understanding of bedrock procedural
elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding.' ' 45 Because Ring
satisfied an exception to the retroactivity bar set forth in Teague, it "must
be given retroactive effect on habeas review.' 46 Therefore, on both
substantive and procedural grounds, the Summerlin court reversed.
140. Id. (reviewing that "[u]nlike strictly procedural rules, 'new rules of substantive
criminal law are presumptively retroactive"') (quoting Santana-Madera v. United States,
260 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2001); see also discussion supra Part I.
141. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 (basing their classification of the Ring rule on "[a]
careful analysis of the structure and history of the relevant Arizona statutes, coupled with
a close examination of the underlying rationale of Ring and the Supreme Court's related
jurisprudence").
142. Id. at 1108 (offering an independent source for retroactive application of Ring).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1109.
145. Id. First, the court found that "there is little doubt" that the Ring rule would
significantly improve the accuracy of Arizona capital trials because juries would not
become acclimated to imposing the death penalty. Id. at 1115. Nor do juries get elected,
making them "less apt to be influenced by external considerations when making their
decisions." Id. Second, Ring "fundamentally altered the procedural structure of capital
sentencing applicable to all states." Id. at 1116. Because Ring established a "bedrock"
principle-that the determination of aggravated circumstances requires jury
deliberation-it functions as a "watershed rule" that alters courts' understanding of
"procedural elements essential to the fairness of the proceeding." Id. Contra Arizona v.
Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003) (doubting that the sentencing scheme in place
before Ring "seriously diminished the likelihood of a fair sentencing hearing"). The
Towery court viewed Ring's outcome as a mere allocation of "the fact-finding duty from
an impartial judge to an impartial jury." Id.
146. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1121 (summarizing the essence of the court's holding that
Ring "defines structural safeguards implicitly in our concept of ordered liberty that are
necessary to protect the fundamental fairness of capital murder trials").
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Summerlin's death sentence, holding that Ring must be applied
retroactively.
47
V. DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES: THE LOGIC BEHIND INTERPRETING A
LAW AS PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE
An examination of the circuits' analytic approaches in classifying Ring
illustrates the merits and downfalls of each method of interpretation. A
great deal depends on a rule's classification because it effectively governs
whether a prisoner on death row can use a new constitutional rule and
possibly avoid execution by the state.'48 When the Supreme Court makes
a new constitutional rule, it often restores a party's constitutional rights;
this is particularly true in the area of capital sentencing. 4 9 These issues
factor into the lower courts' complex debate between preventing an
overburdened appellate system and preserving prisoners' constitutional
rights.'9 8 The careful approach undertaken by courts in determining the
procedural or substantive nature of a new rule demonstrates the
significance of the issue.
147. Id. at 1108. But see Arizona v. Sansing, 77 P.3d 30, 33 n.2 (Ariz. 2003) (asserting
that the Arizona Supreme Court is not bound by the Ninth Circuit's determination of
constitutional requirements). In 1998, John Edward Sansing was sentenced to death based
on two judge-determined aggravating circumstances. Id. at 32. After Ring, the U.S.
Supreme Court vacated the Sansing judgment and remanded it to the Arizona Supreme
Court. Id. In considering whether Sansing was sentenced by a constitutionally infirm
procedure, the Arizona court explicitly discounted the Ninth Circuit's logic in Summerlin.
Id. at 33 n.2. The court affirmed Sansing's death sentence by assuming the mindset of a
jury and decided "beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonable jury would have
concluded that the mitigating evidence was not sufficiently substantial to call for
leniency." Id. at 39.
148. See Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (highlighting the
significance of distinguishing between substance and procedure).
149. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1125 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (arguing that "if our
society truly honors its constitutional values, it will not tolerate the execution by the state
of individuals whose capital sentences were imposed in violation of their constitutional
rights").
150. Compare Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (pointing out that applying
new constitutional rules on collateral review "may be more intrusive than the enjoining of
criminal prosecutions . . . for it continually forces the States to marshal resources in order
to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing
constitutional standards") with Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1125 (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(opining that society cannot tolerate the state's execution of an individual whose capital
sentence violates his constitutional rights); see also United States v. Smith, 250 F.3d 1073,
1074 (7th Cir. 2001) (Wood, J., dissenting) (recognizing that "annual filing statistics from
[the Seventh Circuit] and our sister circuits attest [that] habeas corpus petitions and the
rules of procedural default consume enormous resources for the court"); Towery. 64 P.3d
at 835 (avoiding retroactive application of Ring because it "would greatly disrupt the
administration of justice. . . . Conducting new sentencing hearings, many requiring
witnesses no longer available, would impose a substantial and unjustified burden on
Arizona's administration of justice.").
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A. The Procedural Analysis
A court's analysis of a procedural rule often begins with whether it
changes the actual court proceedings.' For example, the Eleventh
Circuit designated Ring as a procedural rule because it "dictates what
fact-finding procedure must be employed in a capital sentencing
hearing."'' 2 The Turner court found that the Supreme Court's decision
requiring juries, not judges, to find aggravating factors failed to change
the conduct needed to prove a crime or to alter the substantive elements
of the proceeding, such as the government's burden. "  Under this
procedural view, Ring altered who decided the existence of aggravating
circumstances, a function which merely modifies the fact-finding
procedure.'
4
Other circuits also have concluded that Apprendi constituted a
procedural decision."' This significant conclusion inevitably factors into
these circuits' subsequent evaluations of Ring, because Ring should take
on its predecessor's characterization as a procedural rule if it is an
extension of Apprendi.16 In Apprendi, the Supreme Court separated the
substantive basis of enhancing a sentence based on racial bias from the
adequacy of the procedure and determined that the substantive basis for
New Jersey's enhancement statute was not at issue.157  Using this
precedent, the Tenth Circuit deemed Apprendi procedural because it
clarified who determines a sentencing enhancement. 5 Conceding that
the Apprendi rule could increase the accuracy of convictions, the rule is
"simply [one that] 'shifts the fact-finding duties from an impartial judge
to a jury."' 159
151. See Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1284 (11th Cir. 2002) (starting the court's
explanation of Ring as a rule of criminal procedure).
152. Id.
153. Id. In applying Ring to Florida's capital sentencing scheme, the Eleventh Circuit
found that, "Ring changed neither the underlying conduct the state must prove to establish
a defendant's crime warrants death nor the state's burden of proof. Ring affected neither
the facts necessary to establish Florida's aggravating factors nor that State's burden to
establish those factors beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
154. Id.
155. See Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002); McCoy v. United States,
266 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1128-29 (Rawlinson,
J., dissenting) (reviewing the Ninth Circuit's sister circuits' contrary Ring analyses).
156. See Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994 (indicating that Ring obviously extends Apprendi to
the realm of capital punishment).
157. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475 (2000).
158. See id., see also United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002).
159. Mora, 295 F.3d at 1219 (quoting United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 148 (4th
Cir. 2001)).
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B. Summerlin's Substantive Analysis
In making a substantive classification, the Ninth Circuit in Summerlin
v. Stewart relied on Supreme Court precedent as well as its own cases.161
The court's analysis started with Bousley v. United States, 61 where the
Supreme Court rejected the government's non-retroactivity argument
because the case called for the interpretation of a federal statute. ' 62 In
addition, the Ninth Circuit recounted its recent decision in United States
v. Montalvo,'63 where it determined that the Supreme Court's decision in
Richardson v. United States,'64 "requiring jury unanimity on individual
violations alleged as part of a continuing criminal enterprise, [was] a
substantive, not procedural, [decision].' 65 The Ninth Circuit reinforced
the Richardson substantive finding by citing the decisions of its fellow
circuits. 1 6 Under the Summerlin view, a Supreme Court interpretation of
the meaning of a death penalty statute has substantive implications and
should therefore apply retroactively.'
67
In designating Ring as substantive, the Ninth Circuit considered how
the Supreme Court's decision redefined the Arizona capital murder
statute.16" Ring restructured the capital sentencing scheme by making
aggravating factors separate elements; this "necessarily altered both the
substance of the offense of capital murder in Arizona and the substance
of Arizona murder law more generally.' ' 69  Demonstrating the
redefinition of Arizona law as a result of Ring, the Arizona Supreme
160. Surmmerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 (depicting the Ninth Circuit's use of the Supreme
Court's "substantive-procedural logic" in its own rulings).
161. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
162. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 (quoting Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620 (1998)); see also
Bousley, 523 U.S. at 620-21 (recognizing that "under our federal system it is only
Congress, and not the courts, which can make conduct criminal").
163. 331 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).
164. 526 U.S. 813 (1999).
165. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100; see also Montalvo, 331 F.3d at 1056 (interpreting
Richardson, 526 U.S. at 815, as a substantive determination). In Richardson, the
petitioner was charged with a series of violations, including organizing a street gang and
distributing narcotics. 526 U.S. at 816. The Supreme Court reviewed the trial judge's
determination that the jury had to unanimously agree that the defendant committed at
least three drug offenses, but did not have to agree about the particular offenses. Id. The
Seventh Circuit upheld the trial judge's instruction, but the Supreme Court reversed,
finding that "unanimity in respect to each individual violation is necessary." Id.
166. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1100 n.6.
167. Id. at 1106, 1120-21.
168. Id. at 1102 (stating that "Ring effected a redefinition of Arizona capital murder
law, restoring, as a matter of substantive law, an earlier Arizona legal paradigm in which
murder and capital murder are separate substantive offenses with different essential
elements and different forms of potential punishment").
169. Id. at 1105.
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Court vacated death sentences in cases pending on direct appeal, and the
Arizona legislature changed the law to provide for jury sentencing in
capital cases.17  Essentially, Ring established capital murder as a
"separate substantive offense under Arizona law, redefining, in the
process, what the substantive elements of this 'separate offense' of
capital murder are."' 7 ' Therefore, the alteration of the substantive
elements of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme required retroactive
application because, "if our society truly honors its constitutional values,
it will not tolerate the execution by the state of individuals whose capital
sentences were imposed in violation of their constitutional rights."'
7 2
Several Summerlin judges joined in a dissenting opinion, finding the
decision incompatible "with Supreme Court precedent, [the Ninth
Circuit's] prior rulings, or the law of our sister circuits.' ' 7' The
Summerlin dissent attacked the majority's classification of the Ring rule
as substantive. 74 The dissenters did not agree that "merely saying that
creation of a separate substantive criminal offense renders a rule one of
substance rather than procedure.' 75 Under the dissenters' view, Ring
changed "who" determines capital sentences, not "what" they are
sentencing, and a change in determination is "quintessentially
procedural.176 The dissenters sided with other circuits' views of Ring,
arguing that it should not be applied retroactively.
Ultimately, Summerlin demonstrated that substantive criminal law
decisions "reach beyond issues of procedural function and address the
meaning, scope, and application of substantive criminal statutes."'7 8 The
Summerlin court declared that "[w]hen a decision in classifying a new
constitutional rule affects the substantive elements of an offense, or how
170. Id.
171. Id. at 1106.
172. Id. at 1125 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (adding that "[i]t should not take a
constitutional scholar to comprehend" such a point).
173. Id. at 1132 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1126 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the "first point of the
syllogism tarnishes the initial appeal of the majority's logic").
175. Id. (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1128 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (adopting the "who"/ "what" distinction
from State v. Towery, 64 P.3d 828, 833 (Ariz. 2003)).
177. Id. at 1028-29 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting) (citing the Tenth Circuit's conclusion in
Cannon that Ring is procedural and the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Turner that because
Apprendi is a procedural rule, Ring is as well). The dissent supported adherence to
Apprendi, thereby "declar[ing] the nonretroactivity of Ring, and affirm[ing] the district
court's denial of Summerlin's habeas petition." Id. at 1132 (Rawlinson, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1100; see also id. at 1101 (citing an example of a substantive rule as one that
"'analyz[ed] what constitutes 'elements' as opposed to brute facts or 'means"' (quoting
United States v. Montalvo, 331 F.3d 1052, 1056 (9th Cir. 2003))).
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an offense is defined, it is necessarily a decision of substantive law."'' 79 To
that end, the Ninth Circuit recognized that a new constitutional rule
redistributing the aggravating factor determination to the jury is
necessarily a substantive rule of law.""
C. Ambiguity Between the Two: The Hybrid Theory
Unfortunately, the definitive line between substantive and procedural
classifications is not always clear." As the Summerlin court pointed out,
"[i]n the habeas context in particular ... there are those cases that do
'not fall neatly under either the substantive or procedural doctrinal
category."' 82 In such circumstances, "'the best approach is to recognize
that [the case at issue] is neither entirely substantive nor procedural,'...




For example, elements of the Ring decision could be construed as both
procedural and substantive. ' 4 The Ninth Circuit conceded that in a
limited sense, Ring announced a procedural rule because it addressed the
procedure by which the trial must be conducted.8 In the broader
context of Arizona criminal law, however, the decision in Ring went
beyond answering a procedural question-it made Arizona's capital
murder statute unconstitutional."" Under the Summerlin court's
approach, the overarching result of the Ring decision affected the core
substance of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme.1 7 This overwhelming
change seemingly mandated a substantive classification and, therefore, a
retroactive application in order to prevent arbitrary application of the
law.188
179. Id. at 1106.
180. See id. at 1105-06.
181. Id. at 1099-100.
182. Id. at 1101 (quoting United Stated v. Woods, 986 F.2d 669. 677 (3d Cir. 1993)).
183. Id. (quoting Woods, 986 F.2d at 677).
184. Id. at 1101-02.
185. Id. at 1101 (stating that Ring "mandated that a jury, rather than a judge, must find
aggravating circumstances in a capital case").
186. Id. at 1101-02.
187. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102 (demonstrating how Ring altered the essential
substance of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme); see also Lane, supra note 15
(interpreting the Ninth Circuit's logic as finding "that the Ring ruling had so transformed
the constitutional framework governing the imposition of death sentences that it would be
unconstitutional to execute someone who had been sentenced under a pre-Ring system").
188. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122-25 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt
fully supported the court's determination that Ring is a substantive rule. Id. at 1122-23.
Furthermore, he insisted that it must be applied retroactively to prevent an arbitrary or
irrational imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 1124-25. To make his point, Judge
Reinhardt posed the rhetorical question, "[is it possible that prisoners will now be
executed by the state solely because of the happenstance that the Supreme Court
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Apprendi also illustrates the possible ambiguity in determining
whether a new constitutional rule should be classified as procedural or
substantive.'8 9 Simply determining that elements of a crime must be
proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is procedure; yet in the
realm of enhanced sentencing, Apprendi could have effected a
"substantive construction of a federal criminal law."' 9 This ambiguity
breeds debate, as evidenced in the majority and dissent of the Summerlin
court.'9' Because of this uncertainty, courts were in need of guidance and
clarification from the Supreme Court.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT'S FAULTY REMEDY OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Ring in Summerlin provided a
novel approach to the Supreme Court's 2002 ruling. It was uncertain,
however, whether this novel approach would stand in light of its conflict
with other circuits. 93 On December 1, 2003, the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to consider the controversial issues in
Summerlin v. Stewart, and ultimately, to resolve Ring's uncertainty.9 4 On
recognized the correctness of their constitutional arguments too late - on a wholly
arbitrary date, rather than when it should have?" Id. at 1124.
189. See supra text accompanying note 91.
190. Strauss, supra note 16, at 1244-45.
191. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1102-02 n.9 (stating the majority's claim that the dissent
"overstates Ring's affinity to Apprendi and mischaracterizes the first step of our,syllogism'").
192. See Ring Rule, supra note 30, at 1118 (describing the Ninth Circuit's decision as
conflicting with and "in tension with decisions of other circuits").
193. See Lane, supra note 15 (suggesting that "[t]he large number of death sentences
involved [resulting from the Summerlin decision], and the fact that other federal appeals
courts have reached contrary rulings, mean that the Supreme Court probably will agree to
intervene").
194. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003). The petition for writ of certiorari,
presented by petitioner Dora B. Schriro, the recently appointed Director of the Arizona
Department of Corrections and successor in office for Terry Stewart, asks: one,
Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that the new rule announced in Ring is
substantive, rather than procedural, and therefore exempt from the retroactivity
analysis of Teague v. Lane...? [and two,] Did the Ninth Circuit err by holding that
the new rule announced in Ring applies retroactively to cases on collateral
review under Teague's exception for watershed rules of criminal procedure that
alter bedrock procedural principles and seriously enhance the accuracy of the
proceedings?
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Schriro (No. 03-526). The severity of the death penalty
issue and the frequency with which the Supreme Court reviews Ninth Circuit decisions
substantiate the Court's decision to consider Ring's retroactivity in the Schriro decision.
See Daniel Wise, U.S. Supreme Court Feasts on 9th Circuit Cases, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REV., Dec. 4, 2003, at 10 (quoting Thomas Goldstein, a Supreme Court observer, as saying
that "'If a circuit creates a circuit split, en banc, in a habeas case and rules against the
state, it's just automatic that the court is going to take it."'); Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2522
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June 24, 2004, the Court finally ruled on the matter in Schriro v.
Summerlin.'9' The Court definitively stated that "Ring announced a new
procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on
direct review"; subsequently, this closed the debate on the retroactive
applicability of Ring.
19 6
Ruling that Ring constitutes a new procedural rule, and therefore, does
not apply retroactively to final cases on direct review, the Court finally
addressed Summerlin's controversial application of Ring and resolved
the discord among the lower courts. 97 This resolution was particularly
vital, as it was the Supreme Court's failure to classify its own rule that
caused the confusion among the circuits.'9 Moreover, while the main
(explaining the Ninth Circuit's approach in Summerlin and the Court's subsequent grant
of certiorari). The Ninth Circuit has received criticism for its controversial rulings, and the
Supreme Court has reversed a number of its decisions. See Hellman, supra note 127, at
426; see also John Athens, Jr., Comment, The Ninth Circuit Errs Again: The Quiet Title Act
as a Bar to Judicial Review, 19 ALASKA L. REV. 433, 433 (2002) (stating that "[tihe Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals has received criticism for its relatively high rate of questionable
decisions"). In fact, critics insist it "'has an appallingly high reversal rate by the Supreme
Court,' and there has even been criticism within the Ninth Circuit itself." Athens, supra,
at 433-34. In recent years, however, the Ninth Circuit's record has improved at the Court,
"falling more in line with its sister circuits, [b]ut the nation's largest circuit is increasingly
dominating the high court's calendar." Wise, supra (recognizing that at the time of
Summerlin's grant of certiorari, twenty of the fifty-eight certiorari grants from the federal
appeals courts stemmed from the Ninth Circuit, which comprises more than a third of the
docket). Regardless of the Ninth Circuit's reputation or the reasons underlying the
Supreme Court's grant of certiorari, the Court's decision to clarify Ring acknowledged the
gravity of the issue: that the procedural or substantive classification is not a mere
technicality but rather a literal life or death determination. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341
F.3d 1082, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct.
833 (2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Judge Reinhardt reinforced the solemnity of the
procedural/substantive designation by rhetorically asking:
Will we add to all of the other arbitrariness infecting our administration of the
death penalty the pure fortuity of when the Supreme Court recognized its own
critical error with respect to the meaning of the Constitution? . . . A state's
decision to take the life of a human being, if it can be justified at all, must rest on
a far less arbitrary foundation.
Id.; see also Wise, supra (explaining the Ninth Circuit's decision regarding whether to
deem Ring a substantive change and highlighting Judge Reinhardt's concurrence which
"point[s] out that the seemingly arcane question was actually a matter of life or death.")
195. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
196. Id. at 2526.
197. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2526; See Jason Hoppin, 9th Circuit Overturns Death
Sentences; Appeals Court Applies Ring Decision Retroactively, but Split with Other Circuits
may Attract High Court Review, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at 14 (pointing to the
different legal conclusions reached by different state courts and other courts as a key
reason why the Supreme Court would probably review the case).
198. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1096-97 (revealing the Ninth Circuit's obligation to
determine whether the Supreme Court's decision to vacate Ring's capital murder
conviction applies retroactively because the Court failed to categorize its decision itself);
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question in Schriro concerned the retroactive application of Ring, the
Court also attempted to clarify some of the uncertainty surrounding the
classification of rules as procedural or substantive.'99
The holding in Schriro, however, was quite surprising. The Court's
treatment of the right to trial by jury in Ring suggested that the Court• •200
would uphold Summerlin and apply the rule retroactively. In Ring, the
Court considered the "superiority of judicial factfinding" with extreme
skepticism and impliedly supported the freedom inherent in the jury
system . The only way to uphold these values and guard against
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty was to apply Ring
2012
retroactively .
Additionally, the flawed rationale of Turner v. Crosby and Cannon v.
Mullin weighed against the categorization of Ring as procedural. In
Turner, the Eleventh Circuit improperly concluded that Ring was a
procedural rule, finding that "it dictates what fact-finding procedure
must be employed in a capital sentencing hearing."'203 This justification
overlooked Ring's substantial alteration of the "fact-finding procedure,"
2104
from judge to jury. Cannon's logic was equally vulnerable, as the
Turner v. Crosby, 339 F.3d 1247, 1283-85 (11 th Cir. 2003) (depicting the Eleventh Circuit's
evaluation of Ring as a procedural rule; because the Supreme Court avoided
characterizing its own rule, the Eleventh Circuit was left to analyze the retroactivity of
Ring); Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 992 (10th Cir. 2002) (illustrating the petitioner's
attempts to categorize the Ring rule). The Court seemingly invited the circuit confusion
by failing to determine Ring's retroactive applicability sooner. In the death penalty
context, however, this ambiguity remains repugnant because prisoners' lives are at stake.
See Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2003, at A22
(pointing out that more than 100 inmates in five states could be entitled to new sentencing
hearings-an extension of their sentence-if the Court decides to apply Ring
retroactively).
199. See Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521 (stating the Court's purpose as determining
whether Ring "applies retroactively to cases already final on direct review").
200. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (stressing the fact that "[t]he right to
trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it
encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years [as
decided in Apprendi], but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death").
201. Id. at 607 (reminding the courts that although entrusting a judge to determine the
prerequisites for a death sentence may be efficient, "'[t]he founders of the American
Republic were not prepared to leave it to the State, which is why the jury-trial guarantee
was one of the least controversial provisions of the Bill of Rights. It has never been
efficient; but it has always been free.") (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 475
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
202. Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1122, cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.
Ct. 833 (2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
203. Turner, 339 F.3d at 1284.
204. Cf Adam Liptak, Judges' Rulings Imposing Death are Overturned, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003 at Al. Because juries in capital cases tend to be more lenient, a defendant
facing the death penalty is more likely to receive a life sentence. Id. Furthermore, "[o]nly
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Tenth Circuit foreclosed any discussion that Ring was substantive,
despite the obvious differences between a sentence enhancement based
on firearm possession and a death sentence.2 5  Such inconsistent and
incomplete holdings indicated that the Supreme Court would uphold,
and should uphold, Summerlin by declaring the Ring rule substantive.2 6
Rather than doing this, however, the Court instead adopted a rule that
will leave prisoners on death row because they were sentenced under
constitutionally infirm guidelines.21  Unfortunately, for these prisoners,
the Supreme Court declined to follow the Summerlin court's correct
method of retroactive application.2 1  The Ninth Circuit's approach to
Ring's rule was the proper one because it ensured that a defendant's
death sentence was based on a jury's findings of factors beyond a
reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court should have followed this logic,
and deemed Ring a substantive, retroactive rule of law. 29)
VII. CONCLUSION
The conflict among the circuits regarding the proper interpretation of
Ring indicates that the efficacy of the criminal system was at stake. Had
the Supreme Court used its Ring-logic in deciding Walton twelve years
ago, twenty-two people on death row would not have been executed.210
one of 12 jurors needs to be convinced to impose a life sentence; jurors typically confront
such issues once in a lifetime and are more likely to appreciate their gravity [, whereas]
[ellected judges are occasionally swayed by political considerations." Id.
205. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
206. See Murray, supra note 15 (citing law professor and Visiting Judge Charles F.
Baird's prediction that the Supreme Court will adopt the Summerlin court's logic). Judge
Baird believes that "'if we're going to have capital punishment, this Supreme Court is
going to provide very strict judicial scrutiny of how that punishment is imposed and that it
should be done by a jury and not by judge." Id.
207. See Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring), cert. granted sub nom. Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 833 (2003). Judge
Reinhardt put forward the dilemma of inmates sentenced under constitutionally infirm
schemes as:
May the state execute the "Jeffrey Alan Waltons" who are now on death row-
the prisoners who previously correctly argued (or were incorrectly deterred from
arguing) that their executions would be unconstitutional, the prisoners whose
causes were erroneously turned down by the Supreme Court-the prisoners who
were right about the Constitution when the Supreme Court was wrong?
Id.
208. See Greenhouse, supra note 198 (explaining that a ruling that Ring applies retroactively
would wholly alter the lives of more than one hundred inmates in five states sentenced to death).
209. See Beane, supra note 19, at 234 (quoting from Timothy Ring, the human element
for this entire debate, which underscores the significance of jury determination of
aggravating factors: that now, "[tihe prosecutor would have ... to convince 12 people
instead of just one friendly judge.").
210. See, e.g., Hoppin, supra note 197.
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Such inherent unfairness undermines the criminal justice system,
demonstrating that the Supreme Court should have recognized that juror
determination of aggravating factors required retroactive application.
The Summerlin court properly determined Ring's rule as substantive, and
the Supreme Court failed to recognize the soundness of that approach. It
is unfortunate, and perhaps unwise, for the Supreme Court to have
veered from such logic when it could have prevented more executions
211based on constitutionally infirm sentences.
211. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S. Ct. 2519, 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(commenting that a decision to make Ring retroactive only would have affected about 110
people sentenced to death-a "small number" when compared with the 1.2 million
prisoners in state jails.).
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